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Abstract Two experiments show that violations of expected utility due to ambiguity,
found in general decision experiments, also affect belief aggregation. Hence we use
modern ambiguity theories to analyze belief aggregation, thus obtaining more refined
and empirically more valid results than traditional theories can provide. We can now
confirm more reliably that conflicting (heterogeneous) beliefs where some agents
express certainty are processed differently than informationally equivalent imprecise
homogeneous beliefs. We can also investigate new phenomena related to ambiguity.
For instance, agents who express certainty receive extra weight (a cognitive effect
related to ambiguity-generated insensitivity) and generate extra preference value
(source preference; a motivational effect related to ambiguity aversion). Hence,
incentive compatible belief elicitations that prevent manipulation are especially
warranted when agents express certainty. For multiple prior theories of ambiguity,
our findings imply that the same prior probabilities can be treated differently in
different contexts, suggesting an interest of corresponding generalizations.
Keywords Ambiguity . Conflicting sources of information . Source of uncertainty .
Beliefs . Belief aggregation . Prospect theory
JEL Classification D81 . D83
People’s beliefs are mostly shaped by what they learn from other people. For many
important decisions, advice from others, preferably experts, is aggregated into a final
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judgment. Hence, a rich literature has developed on belief aggregation (Clemen and
Winkler 1999; Cooke 1991; Dietrich 2010). This literature has mostly used Savage’s
(1954) subjective probabilities to quantify degrees of belief, implemented in his
Bayesian (expected utility) model for decision making.
Belief aggregation typically concerns events with unknown probabilities. Such
events, commonly called ambiguous, are known to generate non-Bayesian behavior
(Ellsberg 1961; Keynes 1921; Knight 1921). Our paper will show that such devia-
tions from Bayesianism are relevant for belief aggregation. We thus contribute to
recent literature using ambiguity models rather than Bayesian models to analyze
belief aggregation (Baraldi and Zio 2010; Gajdos et al. 2008; Zimper and Ludwig
2009; Teper 2010). These recent papers added decision models to earlier studies that
investigated the aggregation of imprecise probabilities in statistics, fuzzy set theory,
and artificial intelligence (Nau 2002 and its references). Whereas these recent papers
and their predecessors were theoretical, our contribution will be empirical. By
recognizing the empirical violations of Bayesianism, we obtain results for belief
aggregation that are empirically more valid than those obtained before in Bayesian
analyses. We can identify and isolate the relevant factors and their effects more
reliably.
This paper will use Abdellaoui et al.’s (2011) source method to analyze ambiguity.
This method is based on axiomatized decision models (Gilboa 1987; Gilboa and
Schmeidler 1989; Schmeidler 1989; Tversky and Kahneman 1992), and its tradeoff
between parsimony and fit suits our purposes well. In particular, we will use
Abdellaoui et al.’s indexes of pessimism and insensitivity, and will adapt them to
our direct measurements of ambiguity. As explained by these authors, pessimism
(ambiguity aversion in our case) is a motivational component, related to a general
disliking or liking of ambiguity. Insensitivity (in our case ambiguity-generated,
referred to as a-insensitivity) is another, cognitive, component (Kunreuther et al.
2001) prior to any preference and orthogonal to the aversion/seeking component. It
reflects a lack of understanding of uncertainty and is needed, besides ambiguity
aversion, to explain the ambiguity attitudes that are found empirically. It explains,
for instance, that people take uncertainty too much as fifty-fifty, and do not suffi-
ciently discriminate between different levels of likelihood. A-insensitivity is the
extension to ambiguity of the well-known inverse-S shaped probability weighting.
The two components, ambiguity aversion and a-insensitivity, depend on the source of
uncertainty considered, and can, for example, be different when the source of
uncertainty concerns domestic stocks or foreign stocks.
For the sake of clarity, our paper will study the simplest possible situations of
belief aggregation, where there is only one event to be judged by a decision maker
and there are only two agents (we will use this term henceforth) whose judgments are
aggregated by the decision maker. We also assume that there is no interaction
between the agents themselves, or between the agents and the decision maker, so
that no group process is involved.
We will investigate how decision makers aggregate belief judgments for three
sources of uncertainty. The first source serves as a control treatment. Here both agents
are Bayesian and agree with each other (and everyone else). This is the common case
of generally accepted objective probabilities, with no ambiguity involved. We call
this source risk.
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For the second source of uncertainty, each agent alone fully satisfies Bayesianism,
with a precise probability judgment. However, the two agents give different judg-
ments, generating ambiguity for the decision maker aggregating their beliefs.1 This
source of uncertainty, which is characterized by between-agent ambiguity (heteroge-
neous beliefs), is called conflict (C-)ambiguity in this paper.
The third source of uncertainty is characterized by within-agent ambiguity and
relates to the situation where each agent gives an imprecise probability judgment.
This situation is closest to ambiguity as mostly studied in the literature.2 In this paper,
this third source of uncertainty is called imprecision (I-)ambiguity. To keep our
analysis as simple as possible, we assume homogeneous beliefs in the I-ambiguity
case; i.e., the two agents agree. Smithson (1999) and Cabantous (2007) found differ-
ences between the second and third sources of uncertainty (conflict versus impreci-
sion) in experiments, but Cabantous et al. (2011) found no clear differences. Our
paper reconsiders the case using ambiguity theories.
Our experiment concerns loss outcomes. Risk and ambiguity attitudes for losses
are subject to debate and, hence, their study is of special interest. Classical economics
assumes universal risk aversion, but Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory
argued for risk seeking for losses (reviewed by Wakker 2010 p. 264). Most theoretical
studies assume universal aversion to ambiguity, but most empirical studies find
prevailing ambiguity seeking for losses (Viscusi and Chesson 1999; Wakker 2010
p. 354). Although losses and gains are equally important for applications, academic
studies have focused almost exclusively on gains. This paper focuses on risk and
ambiguity for losses.
In two experiments, we measure certainty equivalents of risky prospects and find
the usual violations of expected utility, with inverse-S shaped probability weighting.
This finding underscores the desirability to use nonexpected utility in our descriptive
analysis. We then measure matching probabilities (objective-probability gambles
equivalent to gambles on conflict or imprecision ambiguity).
For I-ambiguity, which is close to the usual form of ambiguity, we find the
common amplification of the overweighting of extreme events, reflecting in-
creased insensitivity. For C-ambiguity, if analyzed in the usual way (taking
midpoints of probability intervals), we find the opposite, with reduced insensi-
tivity. We do not interpret the latter finding as a violation of common views on
ambiguity, but rather as evidence against taking probability midpoints: In C-
ambiguity, experts expressing certainty are believed more than experts express-
ing doubts. This interpretation is supported by direct measurements of belief
that were added in the second experiment. Our finding underscores that agents
may misleadingly suggest certainty in cases of doubt to disproportionally
influence decisions. This makes it extra desirable for principals to ensure that
bonuses are incentive-compatible (Zeckhauser and Viscusi 1990).
1 Studies with varying degrees of conflicting information include Budescu et al. (2003), Cameron (2005),
Dean and Shepherd (2007), Einhorn and Hogarth (1985), Kopylov (2008), Kunreuther et al. (1995), Lobo
and Yao (2010), and Smithson (1999). Viscusi and Chesson (1999) and Viscusi (1997) showed how
conflicting information from different sources is especially prone to generating irrational behavior.
2 See Wallsten et al. (1983). Camerer and Weber (1992), Chow and Sarin (2001), Ellsberg (1961), Ho et al.
(2002, 2005), and Roca et al. (2006) studied attitudes to varying degrees of imprecise probabilities.
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1 Theory
1.1 Prospects and their evaluation
The preferences of a decision maker concern prospects. A prospect yields outcome x
or y, where it is uncertain which of the two will result. We assume x ≤ y ≤ 0
throughout. Hence, outcomes are losses (if negative) or 0. We assume that two agents
have given their judgment on the likelihood of the outcomes, and we consider the
following three situations, formally referred to as sources (of uncertainty).
& Risk: xpy denotes a prospect yielding x with known objective probability p and y
with probability 1−p. Everyone agrees about the probabilities, including the two
agents.
& Imprecision (I) ambiguity: The agents are not able to give a precise probability
judgment, and they only indicate a probability interval. We assume that they give
the same interval [‘,h]. x[‘,h]y denotes the resulting prospect. We assume 0  ‘ 
h  1 throughout.
& Conflict (C) ambiguity: x{‘,h}y denotes the prospect with no known probabilities
available. Both agents give a precise probability judgment, but the two judgments
are different. One agent judges the probability to be ‘, whereas the other judges it
to be h. We again assume 0  ‘  h  1 throughout.
Our study only uses prospects that yield no more than two outcomes, both non-
positive. Virtually all decision models existing today agree on this domain.3 They all
amount to the following evaluation, which we call binary rank-dependent utility.
When choosing between prospects, the one with the highest evaluation is preferred.
xpy 7!wðpÞUðxÞ þ 1 w pð Þð ÞUðyÞ; ð1Þ
x ‘;h½ y 7!W½‘; hU xð Þ þ ð1W½‘; hÞU yð Þ; ð2Þ
x ‘;hf gy 7!Wf‘; hgU xð Þ þ 1Wf‘; hgð ÞU yð Þ: ð3Þ
Here is the utility, assumed continuous and strictly increasing. For
simplicity, we assume U(0)00. Moreover, w: [0,1]→ [0,1] is the probability weight-
ing function, and is assumed continuous and strictly increasing with w(0)00 and
w(1)01. Similarly, W[‘,h] and W{‘,h} are event weighting functions, taking values
between 0 and 1. Note that loss aversion plays no role for pure loss (or gain)
3 For risk these models include, besides Quiggin’s (1982) rank-dependent model: (a) Birnbaum’s (2008)
RAM and TAX models; (b) Gul’s (1991) disappointment aversion theory; (c) Kahneman and Tversky’s
(1979) original prospect theory when restricted to losses; Tversky and Kahneman's (1992) new prospect
theory when restricted to losses; Viscusi’s (1989) prospective reference theory. For uncertainty they
include, besides the rank-dependent (Choquet-expected) utility model of Gilboa (1987) and Schmeidler
(1989), the α-Hurwicz criterion (Arrow and Hurwicz 1972), the maxmin expected utility model (Gilboa
and Schmeidler 1989) and the α-maxmin model, Gajdos et al.’s (2008) contraction expected utility, and
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) prospect theory when restricted to gains or to losses.
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prospects, as in our domain, because it only concerns the exchange rate between gain
and loss utility.
Given that we focus on one event (under different states of information), we do not
need to specify further restrictions on W for the purposes of this paper. It is natural
that both Ws are increasing in ‘ and h. Following the conventions of prospect theory,
we have chosen formulas where the weighting is first applied to the outcome x
farthest remote from 0, which here is the worst loss. Alternative formulas where
the best outcome is weighted first are data equivalent (Wakker 2010 §7.6). Our choice
implies that overweighting (W large) enhances risk aversion and pessimism.
In our experiments, we measure certainty equivalents of risky prospects. The
certainty equivalent (CE) of a prospect is the sure amount that is equally preferred
(indifferent, denoted ~) to the prospect. That is, U(CE) is equal to the above
evaluation of the prospect. We compare different sources of uncertainty. For example,
we define the matching probability of [‘,h] as the probability r such that x[‘,h]y~xry
for all x,y, and the matching probability of {‘,h} as the probability r such that x{‘,h}y~
xry for all x,y. A matching probability always exists and is unique. Because an
indifference for any one pair x < y implies the same indifference for all such x,y,
we can use any such pair to find matching probabilities.
1.2 Properties of probability weighting functions (risk attitude)
Figure 1 depicts some possible properties of weighting functions w(p) for risk. We
will later consider similar properties for other functions (matching probabilities).
Figure 1a depicts overweighting of losses, implying pessimism and enhancing risk
aversion. Figure 1b describes the opposite pattern. Figure 1c shows an inverse-S
shape that combines optimism and pessimism, with overweighting of small proba-
bilities and underweighting of large probabilities. All weights are then moved
towards 0.5, suggesting a lack of sensitivity and of discriminatory power. It is a
move in the direction of taking everything as fifty-fifty.
Although there have not yet been many empirical studies into risk attitudes for
losses, the prevailing shape so far has been the one in Fig. 1d (Wakker 2010 §9.5). It
is the combination of some optimism and insensitivity. It is similar to the prevailing
shape for gains (where the low elevation reflects pessimism rather than optimism),
but is closer to linearity. The underweighting of high probabilities of worst outcomes
implies, by complementarity, that small probabilities of good outcomes are over-
weighted. In what follows, the expression that extreme and rare events are over-
weighted refers to both these phenomena. For the purposes of this paper we need not
p p p p 
d. The pre-
vailing pattern 
c 
−c 
d d 
−d 
c 
a. Overweig-
hting (pessimism) 
w(p) 
1 
1 
0 
c 
d 
1 1 1 
b. Underweig-
hting (optimism) 
w(p) w(p) w(p) 
1 1 1 
0 0 
c. Inverse-S 
(insensitivity) 
Fig. 1 Some properties of weighting functions
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define the aforementioned properties formally, because we can use graphs to illustrate
them. Formal definitions are in Wakker (2010 Chs. 6 and 7).
1.3 Properties of matching probabilities (ambiguity attitude)
We now turn to ambiguity and events E without unknown probabilities. Properties similar
to the ones explained for w(p) can be defined for general weighting functions W(E), even
thoughwe cannot draw graphs forW (Wakker 2010 Ch. 10). For the special case studied
in this paper, graphs can still be devised and used, as will be done in what follows.
We will consider events related to probability pairs
½p r; pþ r and fp r; pþ rg
only for one fixed r (r00.1 in the experiments). These probability pairs thus depend
only on the midpoint probability p, and we can define
W p r; pþ r½  ¼ wi pð Þ ð4Þ
and
W p r; pþ rf g ¼ wc pð Þ: ð5Þ
Here wi is the imprecision weighting function and wc is the conflict weighting
function. In the literature, it is common to relate [p−r, p+r] and {p−r, p+r} to a
degree of belief equal to the midpoint probability p,4 and to interpret r as a measure of
ambiguity. We take this approach as our working hypothesis, we test its plausibility,
and we will later discuss deviations.
Weighting functions W can conveniently be summarized in terms of w, the
weighting function for risk, and matching probabilities m, because, by the evaluations
assumed (Eqs. 1–3), xEy~xm(E)y implies
W Eð Þ ¼ w m Eð Þð Þ: ð6Þ
For later purposes, we rewrite it as
m ¼ w 1 Wð Þ: ð7Þ
Thus, the general attitude towards uncertainty consists of the risk attitude com-
prised by w(p), and added on top of that, the ambiguity attitude comprised by the
matching probability function m. Ambiguity is the difference between uncertainty
and risk, and is thus captured by m. Before ambiguity theories became popular,
matching probabilities were widely used in expected utility to measure subjective
probabilities (Arrow 1951, Footnote 4; Holt 2007 §30.5; Raiffa 1968; Winkler 1972
p. 272). Their usefulness for studying ambiguity has recently been recognized
(Budescu et al. 2002; Hollard et al. 2010; Kahn and Sarin 1988; Viscusi and Magat
1992). Given a fixed r, we can define matching probabilities mi(p) and mc(p) as the
matching probabilities for I- and C-ambiguity (details follow below). They now are
4 See Clemen and Winkler (1986), Cooke (1991), Curley and Yates (1989), Viscusi et al. (1994), and
Wallsten et al. (1997). For a discussion see Larrick and Soll (2006). Underlying theoretical models are in
Gajdos et al. (2008) and Kopylov (2008).
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maps on the unit interval, and graphs can be drawn as before to depict their
properties. We have
W p r; pþ r½  ¼ wi pð Þ ¼ w mi pð Þð Þ; ð8Þ
W p r; pþ rf g ¼ wc pð Þ ¼ w mc pð Þð Þ; ð9Þ
mi pð Þ ¼ w1wi pð Þ and mc pð Þ ¼ w1wc pð Þ: ð10Þ
Pessimism of the matching-probability function m reflects higher pessimism for
uncertainty than for risk, i.e., ambiguity aversion. Insensitivity of m similarly reflects
higher insensitivity for uncertainty than for risk, which we call a(mbiguity-generated)
insensitivity.
Figure 2 depicts some graphs of matching probabilities, using our working
hypothesis that we can use midpoint probabilities on the x-axes. The general attitude
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Fig. 2 Graphs of ambiguity attitudes and indexes
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towards uncertainty (beyond the utility component) is the composition of a curve
from Fig. 1 (risk attitude) and one from Fig. 2 (ambiguity attitude). For example, the
curve in Fig. 1d, if combined with the one in Fig. 2g, gives a curve like these two but
more pronounced. This is consistent with the common empirical finding that attitudes
towards uncertainty are like those towards risk, but more pronounced (Abdellaoui et
al. 2005; Fellner 1961 p. 684; Gayer 2010; Hogarth and Einhorn 1990; Kahn and
Sarin 1988 p. 270; Kahneman and Tversky 1979 p. 281; Kilka and Weber 2001;
Machina 1982 p. 292; Weber 1994 p. 237/238). In other words, the effects of
ambiguity (matching probabilities) reinforce those of risk.
1.4 Indexes of aversion and insensitivity towards ambiguity
This paper quantitatively analyses ambiguity attitudes through matching probabili-
ties, using Abdellaoui et al.’s (2011) indexes of pessimism and insensitivity. We
modify these indexes regarding two aspects of our study. First, we deal with losses.
Consequently, overweighting captures pessimism, and not optimism as for gains. We
therefore multiply the original pessimism index by −1 so that it still corresponds with
pessimism. Second, we consider these indexes for matching probabilities (as func-
tions of midpoint probabilities) rather than for regular weighting functions. This
means that the risk component w has been removed. Thus, the index of pessimism
represents the extra pessimism generated by ambiguity on top of the pessimism for
risk. That is, it reflects ambiguity aversion. Similarly, the index of a-insensitivity
captures the extra insensitivity generated by ambiguity.
To compute the indexes, we use linear regression to find linear functions
cþ sp truncated at values 0 and 1ð Þ ð11Þ
that best fit the (data points observed regarding the) matching probabilities. We
emphasize that this regression line should not be interpreted as a statistical estimation.
It only serves to recode data using mathematical calculations. Thus, we choose c and
s in Eq. 11 to minimize a squared distance without any reference to an underlying
statistical model. Similarly, the linear regression should not be interpreted as any
commitment to the neo-additive weighting functions of Eq. 11. It can be applied to
any weighting function chosen by a researcher, also if not neo-additive, and to any set
of data points, so as to obtain indexes of ambiguity attitude.
We call d the dual intercept, i.e. d ¼ 1 c s. We define
c d : index of ambiguity aversion ð12Þ
and
cþ d ¼ 1 sð Þ : index of a insensitivity: ð13Þ
In Fig. 2, higher rows correspond with higher curves and higher indexes of
ambiguity aversion. Writing qa for an ambiguous (midpoint) probability q of [q−r,
q+r] or of {q−r, q+r}, the matching probabilities of 0.5a are 0.46, 0.50, and 0.54 in
the central Fig. 2h, e, and b, respectively. These correspond with indifferences
−10000.5a0~−10000.460, −10000.5a0~−10000.500, and −10000.5a0~−10000.540,
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respectively. The indifferent risky prospect becomes more and more unfavorable, in
agreement with more and more ambiguity aversion.
Left curves in Fig. 2 correspond with increased a-insensitivity. We consider a
pair of ambiguous prospects (−10000.1a0, −10000.9a0). Here, and in the pairs
considered next, the right prospect is more unfavorable. We consider the pair
for the right, central, and left figures in the middle row. These figures give the
following pairs of risky prospects indifferent to the two ambiguous prospects.
Figure 2f: (−10000.020, −10000.980); Fig. 2e: (−10000.100, −10000.900); Fig. 2d:
(−10000.180, −10000.820). In these three pairs, the two risky prospects get closer
and closer to each other. The subject discriminates different levels of likelihood less
and less, and exhibits more and more a-insensitivity. This effect is related to the
cognitive component of discriminating different levels of likelihood under ambiguity.
Figure 2e depicts neutrality with respect to both components, and both indexes are 0
there.
In general, the indexes of Abdellaoui et al. (2011) can be calculated for any
function on the unit interval, or set of data points of such a function. They involve the
best-fitting regression line on the (0,1) interval, and reflect global elevation and
sensitivity. Their interpretations depend on the function for which they are calculated.
Abdellaoui et al. (2011) considered the indexes for source functions, transform-
ing additive subjective probabilities into decision weights, and capturing all
deviations from expected utility. Ambiguity attitudes, reflecting differences
between known and unknown probabilities, could then be derived from differ-
ences between source functions for unknown probabilities and those for known
probabilities. We consider the indexes for matching probabilities. As Eqs. 6–10
show, the risk component has then been removed and, hence, our indexes directly
reflect ambiguity. It is a common working hypothesis in studies of probability
intervals that matching probabilities equal to the midpoints of those intervals reflect
ambiguity neutrality, as in Fig. 2e.
2 Experiment A: measuring risk attitudes and ambiguity attitudes for imprecise
and conflicting sources of information
This first, explorative, experiment examines risk and ambiguity attitudes for I-
and C-sources.
Analysis We measure certainty equivalents of several prospects. We first derive
utility and probability weighting for risk. Then we study ambiguity attitudes by
analyzing how the two ambiguous sources differ from risk. The latter is done by
analyzing how their matching probabilities differ from the corresponding midpoint
probabilities. In what follows, we derive matching probabilities from parametric
fitting. Appendix A3 reports on the results of an alternative, parameter-free analysis,
based on direct comparisons of CEs, which gives results consistent with those
reported in the main text. We use power utility,
u xð Þ ¼  x=1000ð Þ"; x  0; " > 0; ð14Þ
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and Goldstein and Einhorn’s (1987) probability weighting function,
w pð Þ ¼ dpg=ðdpg þ 1 pð ÞgÞ; d  0; g  0; ð15Þ
to fit data for risk. These families are commonly used. Utility u is concave (u′
decreasing as the negative x increases towards 0), enhancing risk aversion, whenever
β ≥ 1, and it is convex whenever β ≤ 1.
The larger δ is, the more elevated the probability weighting curve is, generating
more pessimism. The larger γ is, the more sensitive the curve is. If we calculate the
pessimism and insensitivity indexes for the probability weighting functions for risk
considered here,5 then δ will be closely related to the pessimism index and γ will be
closely related to the insensitivity index.
In both experiments, we used a standard nonlinear least square regression (Lev-
endberg-Marquadt algorithm) to simultaneously obtain the estimates of the utility and
probability weighting parameters. Throughout this paper, t-tests are two-sided unless
stated otherwise.
Subjects N061 post-graduate students (60 male, median age022) in civil engineering
at Arts et Métiers ParisTech, Paris, France6 were invited by email. None of them had
participated in an experiment on decision making before.
Stimuli We measured the certainty equivalents of the 20 prospects in Table 1.
Throughout this paper, the probability spread r is 0.1. For each source, we considered
five different (midpoint) probability levels p, namely 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9. For
example, prospect number A11 (−1000[0,0.2]0) was the second one presented to the
subjects, as indicated by rank 2 in the table.
Incentives The subjects were given a fixed €10 participation fee. Our use of hypo-
thetical choice rather than real incentives is discussed in §4.
Procedure The prospects were presented to the subjects on a computer screen in a
fixed random order (see the column Rank in Table 1). The sure loss was always
displayed on the right-hand side of the screen and the other prospect was shown on
the left-hand side. The subjects had to choose between these two options. The
following text was given to the subjects to describe the risky prospects, where the
agents were called experts: “The two experts have exactly the same best estimate of
the risk. Each expert confidently estimates that there is a (100p)% risk of losing €x
(otherwise, the loss is €y)” (screenshot A in Fig. 6 in the appendix). We substituted
the appropriate numerical values for p. Screenshots of typical choice tasks are
available in the appendix.
The explanation for C-ambiguity was as follows: “The two experts do not agree on
the risk. They have different best estimates: Expert A confidently estimates that there
is a 100(p−0.1)% risk of losing €1000 (otherwise, the loss is €0). Expert B confi-
dently estimates that there is a 100(p+0.1)% risk of losing €1000 (otherwise, the loss
5 Here they do not reflect ambiguity attitudes but risk attitudes.
6 The instructions and the presentations of the prospects in the experiment were accordingly written in
French.
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is €0)” (screenshot B in Fig. 6). We substituted the appropriate numerical values for p
+0.1 and p−0.1. In addition, we displayed two different pie graphs, one for each
expert’s prediction, to visually make clear that the two experts did not have the same
estimate of the probability of the loss.
The explanation for I-ambiguity was as follows: “The two experts have exactly the
same best estimate of the risk. Each expert confidently estimates that the risk of losing
€x ranges from 100(p−0.1)% to 100(p+0.1)% (otherwise, the loss is €0).” A dynamic
pie was shown on the screen to convey the imprecision of the forecast, with the size
of the sectors of the pie chart slowly changing between the two bounds of the interval.
Measuring certainty equivalents For each of the 20 prospects, the subjects were
asked to make approximately 5 binary choices between the prospect and a sure loss
in a bisection procedure. In this procedure, the midpoint between the best sure loss
less preferred and the worst sure loss more preferred than the prospect is taken as the
CE of the prospect. Details are in the appendix.
Checking consistency At the end of the experiment, the subjects were asked to give their
preferences between 6 prospects (A1, A3, A16, A18, A11, and A13) and their expected
value a second time (the first time was as the first preference question in bisection).
2.1 Results
2.1.1 Consistency checks
Table 2 gives the consistency rates for the six questions presented twice. The consis-
tency rates vary between 69% and 89%, with an average of 77.32%. In other words,
Table 1 The 20 prospects whose certainty equivalents were elicited in Experiment A
# Rank Source p x y # Rank Source p x y
A1 13 Risk 0.1 −1000 0 A11 2 I 0.1 −1000 0
A2 3 Risk 0.3 −1000 0 A12 17 I 0.3 −1000 0
A3 8 Risk 0.5 −1000 0 A13 6 I 0.5 −1000 0
A4 5 Risk 0.7 −1000 0 A14 10 I 0.7 −1000 0
A5 9 Risk 0.9 −1000 0 A15 11 I 0.9 −1000 0
A6 7 Risk 0.5 −500 0 A16 15 C 0.1 −1000 0
A7 18 Risk 0.5 −500 −250 A17 16 C 0.3 −1000 0
A8 20 Risk 0.5 −750 −500 A18 19 C 0.5 −1000 0
A9 14 Risk 0.5 −1000 −500 A19 12 C 0.7 −1000 0
A10 4 Risk 0.5 −1000 −750 A20 1 C 0.9 −1000 0
For risk, prospect A1 (−10000.10) yields −1000 with probability 0.1, and nil otherwise.
For I (imprecision ambiguity), prospect A11 (−1000[p−0.1,p+0.1]0) yields −1000 with a judged probability
between 0 (00.1−0.1) and 0.2 (00.1+0.1), and nil otherwise.
For C (conflict ambiguity), prospect A16 1000½p0:1;pþ0:10
 
yields −1000 with a judged probability 0
(00.1−0.1) or 0.2 (00.1+0.1), and nil otherwise.
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approximately three-quarters of the subjects gave the same answer the second time. This
rate agrees with common findings in the field (Abdellaoui 2000; Camerer 1989).
2.1.2 Risk attitudes from parametric fitting
Table 3 displays the results from data fitting for risk.
The estimated β exceeds 1 (p<0.01, t6003.99), indicating concave utility. The
probability weighting function exhibits a small degree of elevation (pessimism), and
the usual inverse-S shape (δ<1, p<0.01, t600−6.00; γ<1, p00.03, t600−2.24).
Details are in the appendix.
2.1.3 Ambiguity attitudes from parametric fitting using matching probabilities
Having estimated the utility function U, weights W(E) can be obtained from indif-
ferences CE~xEy, for E0{‘,h} or E0[‘,h] using the formula
W Eð Þ ¼ U CEð Þ  U xð Þ
U yð Þ  U xð Þ : ð16Þ
With all weighting functions available, we obtain matching probabilities through
Eq. 10. Figure 3 reports their mean values and 95% confidence intervals. This figure
provides a graphical illustration of I- and C-ambiguity attitudes. The figures are
similar to Fig. 2a and f, but are closer to linearity.
The ambiguity aversion index for I is positive (mean00.06, p<0.01, t6002.94). We
find no ambiguity aversion or seeking for C-ambiguity (mean00.00; p00.97,
t6000.04). The index of I-ambiguity aversion exceeds that of C-ambiguity aversion
(p<0.01, t6002.75). The a-insensitivity index for I-ambiguity is positive (mean00.13,
p<0.01, t6003.84) and for C-ambiguity it is negative (mean0−0.05, p00.04,
Table 2 Consistency check (Experiment A)
Source of uncertainty Risk I C
Prospect # A1 A3 A11 A13 A16 A18
Number of consistent subjects 42 54 51 47 45 44
Consistency rate 69% 89% 84% 77% 74% 72%
For six prospects of Table 1, the choice between them and their expected value was repeated. For prospect
A1, 69% of the subjects chose the same both times.
Table 3 Parameters of the utility and weighting functions that best fit the certainty equivalents for risky
choices (Experiment A)
Function Parameter Mean (Median) SD
u xð Þ ¼  x=1000ð Þb ; x  0 β (concavity) 1.26 (1.13) 0.52
w pð Þ ¼ dpg= dpg þ 1 pð Þgð Þ δ (elevation) 0.75 (0.72) 0.33
γ (S-shape) 0.86 (0.73) 0.49
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t600−2.08). It is, obviously, higher for I-ambiguity than for C-ambiguity (p<0.01,
t6006.83).
We find the following differences for matching probabilities: mi(0.1)>0.1
(mean00.19, p<0.01, t6004.43), mi(0.9)<0.9 (mean00.86, p<0.01, t600−2.87),
and mc(0.1)<0.1 (mean00.06, p<0.01, t600−4.20). An ANOVA corrected for re-
peated measures (with the Greenhouse-Geisser correction) with two factors (the five
probability levels and the two types of ambiguity) and their interaction confirms the
above results. The probability level is significant (p<0.01, F3.110492.94). The
matching probabilities differ across the two types of ambiguity (p<0.01,
F0.107.57). These differences are influenced by the probability level (p<0.01,
F205.1709.24). Using paired t-tests adjusted with the Bonferroni correction, we find
that mi(0.1)>mc(0.1) (p<0.01, t600−6.71) and mi(0.9)<mc(0.9) (p<0.01, t6003.50).
Other differences are not significant. To illustrate the size of the differences found,
consider a loss of €1000 with a midpoint probability p00.10. The average CE is €102
for conflict-ambiguity, €146 for risk, and €221 for imprecision-ambiguity. Such
small-probability losses are relevant for insurance, where the different sources gen-
erate big differences in insurance premiums.
2.2 Summary and discussion of results of Experiment A
Risk attitudes Our results for probability weighting under risk agree with the
prevailing findings in the literature. We find an inverse-S shape with over-
weighting of small probabilities and underweighting of moderate and large
probabilities. The latter enhances optimism and risk seeking for losses. We find
weakly concave utility. Many papers have found that utility for losses is close
to linear and preferences are close to risk neutrality (reviewed by Wakker 2010
p. 264). Abdellaoui et al. (2008) also found weakly concave utility in combination
with weakly prevailing risk seeking for losses.
Viscusi et al. (2011) showed that observations of other people’s choices do
influence own decisions even when the own risks are fully known, so that the choices
of the other people are not informative. This effect can play a role in our experiment if
00
mi 
0
0.8
0.2
0.40.2 0.80.6 1
0.4
0.6
1
pI 
0.2
0 0.40.2 0.80.6 1
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
p
mc 
C 
Fig. 3 Estimated marginal means of I- (imprecision) and C- (conflict) matching probabilities (Experiment A)
J Risk Uncertain (2012) 44:115–147 127
the experts’ information is taken as reflecting the experts’ decisions. However, this
effect is intrinsic in belief aggregation, and we do not consider it to be a distortion.
Evidence against the Bayesian model As just explained, the probability weighting
functions for risk deviate significantly from the Bayesian identity function w(p) 0 p,
falsifying expected utility. The deviations of the curves in Fig. 3 by themselves could
be accommodated by the Bayesian model, by assuming that (Bayesian) subjective
probabilities deviate from the midpoints of the intervals. However, these deviations
are too pronounced at the extremes, especially for I-ambiguity, to be plausible.
Experiment B will provide further evidence.
I-ambiguity aversion and C-ambiguity neutrality The predictions on ambiguity aver-
sion for losses are divided in the literature. The common assumption, especially in the
theoretical literature, is universal ambiguity aversion, for both gains and losses, and some
empirical studies have confirmed this. Yet, most empirical studies have found prevailing
ambiguity seeking, rather than aversion, for losses (reviewed by Wakker 2010 p. 354).
Thus, the case is not very clear for losses. One reason that patterns for losses are less
clear is that losses are more difficult for subjects to process than gains, and losses
generate more noise (de Lara Resende and Wu 2010 p. 129). The (global) ambiguity
aversion indexes for matching probabilities show that there is more pessimism for I-
ambiguity than for risk; i.e., we find more I-ambiguity aversion than I-ambiguity
seeking. For C-ambiguity on the other hand, the overall index does not deviate from
neutrality and there is as much C-ambiguity aversion as C-ambiguity seeking.
A-insensitivity for I- and C-ambiguity Because insensitivity is a cognitive compo-
nent, it can be expected to be less affected by the domain (gain or loss) of outcomes.
Hence we can expect to find a-insensitivity, commonly observed in the gain domain,
in the loss domain as well. We indeed find a-insensitivity for I-ambiguity. In other
words, people are more insensitive towards imprecise probabilities (I-ambiguity) than
towards known probabilities (risk). Thus, I-ambiguity amplifies insensitivity. This
agrees with the common finding that uncertainty amplifies phenomena found under
risk. Several studies have observed a-insensitivity in the gain domain (Abdellaoui et
al. 2005; Fellner 1961 p. 684; Gayer 2010; Kahn and Sarin 1988 p. 270; Kahneman
and Tversky 1975 p. 15 2nd para; Kahneman and Tversky 1979 p. 281 lines −6/−5
and p. 289 l. 5–6; Kilka and Weber 2001; Viscusi 1989; Weber 1994 pp. 237–238).
For losses, we are aware of only one study examining a-insensitivity (Abdellaoui et
al. 2005); they confirmed it. It leads, for instance, to lower insurance premiums rather
than the higher ones predicted by the universal ambiguity aversion often assumed in
theoretical studies.
The findings for C-ambiguity regarding insensitivity do not agree with the com-
mon finding of a-insensitivity when analyzed in the usual way. We find less, rather
than more, insensitivity than under risk. This finding is hard to reconcile with modern
views on ambiguity, and suggests that background assumptions are violated. We will
explore and discuss this suggestion in more detail in Experiment B.
Explanation for over-sensitivity and less ambiguity aversion in C-ambiguity In
general, there must be a control for degrees of belief to measure ambiguity
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attitudes. For example, if we find a preference for gambling on an ambiguous
rather than on an unambiguous event and want to explain this finding as
ambiguity aversion, then the two events must have the same degree of belief/
likelihood in some sense. In situations of ambiguity as considered here, com-
parisons are usually made between events with the same midpoint probabilities,
where the latter should provide the required control. We have followed this
averaging tradition in our analysis for both I- and C-ambiguity.
For extreme events in C-ambiguity, the above belief/likelihood control may
be problematic though. If the first agent assigns probability 1 to some event
and the second agent assigns probability 0.8, then the first agent is apparently
sure whereas the second is uncertain. It then makes sense to assign more
confidence weight (Nau 2002) to the first, sure, agent’s judgment than to the
second, insecure, judgment. The perceived likelihood will then exceed the midpoint
0.9. Such a processing of information is perfectly sensible, and leads to the high
weight assigned to such events. It can be captured by rational Bayesian decision
models, irrespective of any ambiguity. Our finding then implies that agents who
express certainty receive extra weight in conflicting-belief aggregation. This is
consistent with findings by Budescu and Yu (2006, 2007), Yates et al. (1996), and
Keren and Teigen (2001). It generates an effect counter to a-insensitivity, and, if it is
not recognized, it may seem that neutrality or even oversensitivity was found, as
happened in our experiment.
One clear implication of our research is therefore to caution against the common
practice in experiments on probability intervals to control for likelihood perceptions
of such intervals through their midpoints. Our findings indeed show that probability
intervals and, more generally, sets of multiple priors cannot all be analyzed in the
same way. The source of uncertainty matters. In particular, we cannot just equate {‘,
h} with its convex hull [‘,h]. It matters whether agents have the same or different
information (Crès et al. 2011; Dietrich 2010).
Gajdos et al.’s (2008) contraction expected utility model, theoretically extended
to belief aggregation by Gajdos and Vergnaud (2011), can be an alternative to our
source method for analyzing the phenomena found here. Their contractions of a priori
given probability intervals can be used to differentiate between different sources of
uncertainty. To gain more insight into motivational versus cognitive factors underly-
ing our explanation, we devised another experiment presented in the next section.
3 Experiment B
3.1 Introduction
Because Experiment A raises questions about subjective probabilities and the (cognitive)
likelihood perception of extreme events, Experiment B focuses on such events. We now
additionally ask for direct judgments of probability. Although such data is not based on
revealed preferences, it can shed further light on the cognitive conjectures resulting from
Experiment A. These conjectures entail that people do not have a different ambiguity
attitude in the C-ambiguity of x{0.8,1}y than in the I-ambiguity of x[0.8,1]y. Instead, they
simply have a higher degree of belief that x will happen. It will enhance S-shaped
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judged probabilities (as functions of midpoint probabilities) for C-ambiguity. If these
conjectures are correct, then direct probability judgments can support them.
3.2 Experimental method
In most respects, this experiment is like Experiment A. We focus on the differences in
what follows.
Protocol N063 bachelor and master students (36 male, median age020.5, 40 Dutch)
at Erasmus University, Rotterdam, the Netherlands participated, taken from an email
list of students willing to participate in experiments on decision making. They were
guaranteed a €15 flat participation fee. The experiment was conducted in six sessions
of 10 or 11 subjects.7
We first asked the subjects to answer binary choice questions, as in Experiment A,
using the same software. We elicited CEs of the 18 prospects displayed in Table 4.
The order of the prospects was randomized for each subject.
Unlike in Experiment A, we also asked the subjects to give their judged beliefs for
the prospects B13-B18. We randomly selected one prospect to check the stability of
the answers. Two subjects gave erratic judged beliefs, showing lack of understanding,
and were removed from the sample.
Stimuli To elicit judged beliefs, we presented the subjects with a figure displaying a
prospect (I-ambiguity or C-ambiguity) on the left-hand side of the screen. On the
right-hand side, there was an input box where subjects could type their best estimate
(on a 0–1 scale) of the probability of losing €1000. As soon as the best estimate was
entered, a pie appeared to visually represent the probability. Figure 7 in the appendix
displays an example of a screenshot.
Checking consistency Unlike in Experiment A, in Experiment B we did not measure
consistency by asking the subjects to repeat choices between some prospects and their
expected value. Instead, we randomly selected two prospects and asked the subjects
to go through the whole CE elicitation process again. As explained before, we also
repeated the elicitation of one judged belief per subject.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Consistency checks
We find no difference between the two CEs elicited for consistency checks (p00.18,
t1210−1.36). The repeated judged beliefs did not differ either (p00.49, t6000.69).
7 In this second experiment, unlike Experiment A, subjects were not individually interviewed by the
experimenter. They could ask questions as often as needed. Instructions were in English, as is often done
in the Netherlands where many students are non-Dutch.
130 J Risk Uncertain (2012) 44:115–147
3.3.2 Risk attitudes from parametric fitting
We estimated the parameters of the utility function and the probability weighting
function (Table 5) using the twelve risky prospects B1–B12 in Table 4. The estimate
of β exceeds 1 (p<0.01, t6004.36), indicating concave utility. This result is consistent
with Experiment A.
As in Experiment A, the mean value of δ is smaller than 1 (p00.02, t600−2.36),
enhancing optimism. Unlike in Experiment A, the mean value of γ is not different
from 1 here (t-test: p00.24, t6001.18). Experiment B’s probability weighting function
therefore is closer to linear, which is not uncommon for losses.
3.3.3 Ambiguity attitudes from parametric fitting using matching probabilities
We derived matching probabilities as in Experiment A. For I-ambiguity, the a-insensitivity
index is positive (mean00.12, p<0.01, t6003.64) and the ambiguity aversion index is
positive but only marginally significant (mean00.03, p00.08, t6001.77). I-ambiguity
therefore exhibits the same pattern as in Experiment A (i.e., Fig. 4 is similar to
Fig. 2a/d). For C-ambiguity, both indexes do not differ from 0 (i.e., Fig. 4 is similar to
Fig. 2e). The I-index of a-insensitivity exceeds the C-index (p<0.01, t6003.31), but
the I-index of ambiguity aversion is not larger (p00.28, t6001.09).
Table 4 The 18 prospects whose certainty equivalents were elicited in Experiment B, with notation as in
Table 1
# Source p x y # Source p−r p+r x y
B1 Risk 0.1 −1000 0 B13 I 0 0.2 −1000 0
B2 Risk 0.2 −1000 0 B14 I 0.4 0.6 −1000 0
B3 Risk 0.4 −1000 0 B15 I 0.8 1 −1000 0
B4 Risk 0.5 −1000 0 B16 C 0 0.2 −1000 0
B5 Risk 0.6 −1000 0 B17 C 0.4 0.6 −1000 0
B6 Risk 0.8 −1000 0 B18 C 0.8 1 −1000 0
B7 Risk 0.9 −1000 0
B8 Risk 0.5 −500 0
B9 Risk 0.5 −500 −250
B10 Risk 0.5 −750 −500
B11 Risk 0.5 −1000 −500
B12 Risk 0.5 −1000 −750
Table 5 Parameters of the utility and weighting functions that best fit the certainty equivalents for risky
choices (Experiment B)
Function Parameter Mean (Median) SD
u xð Þ ¼  x=1000ð Þb ; x  0: β 1.37 (1.26) 0.68
w pð Þ ¼ dpg= dpg þ 1 pð Þgð Þ: δ (elevation) 0.81 (0.69) 0.61
γ (sensitivity) 1.17 (0.98) 1.09
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For I-ambiguity, we find overestimation for midpoint probability 0.1 (mean00.16,
p<0.01, t6003.30), and we find underestimation for midpoint probability 0.9 (mean0
0.86, p00.01, t600−2.57). The matching probabilities for C-ambiguity do not deviate
from the midpoint probabilities 0.1 and 0.9. They are only somewhat higher for
midpoint probability 0.5 (mean00.54, p<0.01, t6002.77). As in Experiment A, C-
matching probabilities do not exhibit an inverse-S shape.
An ANOVA corrected for repeated measures and with two factors (the three
probability levels and the two types of ambiguity) and their interaction reveals that,
in addition to the probability level (p<0.01, F1.890757.32), the interaction term is
significant (p<0.01, F1.8007.96). Using paired t-tests adjusted with the Bonferroni
correction, we find mi(0.1)>mc(0.1) (p<0.01, t600−4.38) as in Experiment A.
3.3.4 Judged beliefs
Figure 5 displays the mean values of the I- and C-judged beliefs as a function
of midpoint probabilities. It shows that the judged beliefs never differ from the
midpoint probabilities for I-ambiguity. However, they exceed the midpoint
probability at probability 0.9 for C-ambiguity (mean00.91, p<0.01, t6002.72).
By t-tests, only the a-insensitivity index for C-ambiguity is marginally significant,
and it is negative (mean0−0.01, p00.09, t6001.75), suggesting over-sensitivity.
Apart from this, perceived probabilities seem to agree well with midpoint
probabilities.
We next compare matching probabilities with judged beliefs. Matching prob-
abilities exhibit more insensitivity. The difference is significant for I-ambiguity
(mean difference00.11, p<0.01, t6003.44) but not for C-ambiguity (mean differ-
ence00.04, p00.12, t6001.58). An ANOVA with two factors (the elicitation tech-
nique—matching probabilities vs judged beliefs; and the types of ambiguity) and
their interaction confirms the results of t-tests: the main effect of elicitation technique
is significant (p<0.01, F0.108.39), like the source (p<0.01, F1014.46) and the
interactions term (p00.02, F105.90). The same analysis on the ambiguity aversion
indexes does not give significant results.
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3.4 Summary of the results of Experiment B
The results of Experiment B are consistent with those of Experiment A for risk and
ambiguity (matching probabilities) attitudes. Again, we find significant violations of
expected utility for risk and we find the usual a-insensitivity for I-ambiguity but not
for C-ambiguity. For I-ambiguity, the judged beliefs agree with midpoint probabilities,
supporting the use of midpoint probabilities as levels of belief. This supports our claim in
the discussion of Experiment A, under “evidence against the Bayesian model,” that the
weights in Figs. 3 and 4 do not reflect (just) subjective probabilities, but that some-
thing else is going on: nonneutral attitudes towards ambiguity, deviating from
expected utility.
The judged beliefs for C-ambiguity deviate from the midpoint probabilities. The
judged belief at 0.9 exceeded 0.9, and the index of a-insensitivity was (marginally)
below the neutral value 0. This extra sensitivity went against the usual a-insensitivity,
and these two effects together gave the end result of no a-insensitivity for C-
ambiguity. The extra oversensitivity relative to I-ambiguity was not caused by a
change in the non-Bayesian component of ambiguity attitude or perception. Instead, it
took place at the level of beliefs, i.e. of perceived likelihood. It would have occurred
similarly had the decision makers been Bayesian.
4 Discussion
Real incentives and hypothetical choice It is well known that performance-
contingent real incentives are desirable in experiments. They enhance truthful
answering and reduce noise (Camerer and Hogarth 1999; Hertwig and Ortmann
2001). Designing real decision situations with agent judgments available and dis-
agreeing as required for our research, and doing so without deceiving these agents or
the subjects, is very difficult to implement. We preferred to keep this first empirical
study on belief aggregations under ambiguity simple and clear, which is why we
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chose a flat payment and hypothetical choice.8 Given the ubiquity of belief aggrega-
tion in social behavior, and the necessity to consider ambiguity there, we felt that
empirical studies are warranted even if no real incentives are possible.
There are extra reasons for using hypothetical choice when studying the, empirically
important, losses. First, implementing real losses by making the subjects lose their own
money is ethically questionable and hard to implement. The common implementation of
losses, with prior endowments from which subjects pay back, has another serious
drawback. Many subjects will integrate the payments and will not perceive any losses.
Even if, as some studies have found, this number of subjects is a minority, say it is one-
third, then still this minority may generate large distortions in the experiment, large
enough to be responsible for any significant effects found. One-third of the subjects
misperceiving the stimuli entails too big a distortion, and is too high a price to pay for
implementing real incentives. Another drawback of prior endowments is that they may
generate house money effects (Thaler and Johnson 1990).
Directly measuring matching probabilities We measured matching probabilities m(E)
indirectly from decision weights, through m Eð Þ ¼ w1 W Eð Þð Þ. Matching probabilities
can be inferred directly from equivalences (xq0)~(xE0). Substitution of Eqs. 1–3 then
gives m(E) 0 q. We tried such direct measurements in pilots. Unfortunately, many
subjects would routinely take q equal to the midpoint probability, not as an expression of
true preference but as an easy heuristic. For this reason, and because the measurement of
w and W is useful anyhow, we decided not to measure matching probabilities directly.
Alternative statistics for measuring ambiguity: avoiding commitment to parametric
families We could have chosen several equivalent ways to report the results from the
three sources and the comparisons between them. We first reported absolute results
for risk. For uncertainty, we reported differences with risk, i.e. how uncertainty
deviates from risk. Those differences are referred to as ambiguity, an important and
popular topic in the literature today. Absolute results about decisions under uncer-
tainty can now be derived indirectly, as when taking compositions of the curves in
Figs. 1 and 2. For example, we find some overweighting for risk, and some additional
overweighting due to ambiguity for midpoint probability 0.1. Together this means
that there is considerable overweighting under uncertainty.
To analyze ambiguity, we could also have investigated differences of certainty
equivalents of the risky and the uncertain prospects. This analysis is consistent with
the one reported here and is in the appendix. Thus, our conclusions do not depend on
the particular parametric families that we chose to fit the risk attitudes.
Formal difference with the source method of Abdellaoui et al. (2011) In Abdellaoui et
al.’s (2011) source method, sources refer to different algebras, i.e. different collections
of subsets (events) of the state space. We, instead, compared the same (algebra of) events
under different informational circumstances. Although our sources are formally different,
we can nevertheless readily use the same techniques of comparing ambiguity attitudes by
comparing differences in subjective-probability weighting. Abdellaoui et al.’s (2011)
analysis of source functions rather than matching probabilities was discussed in §1.
8 For this reason, we also assumed that the beliefs were reported simultaneously. Inconsistency of
sequential beliefs due to updating or changes of mind is studied by Li (2007).
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Specifying outcomes when measuring beliefs We decided to specify outcomes in the
elicitation of beliefs, to stay close to the other stimuli in the experiment. It implies that
some subjects may have taken these questions as preference questions, directly mea-
suring the matching probabilities. We obviously asked for judged likelihoods and not for
preferences, hoping to trigger enough direct belief perceptions to obtain significant
effects, which we did indeed obtain. The distortion due to misperception as decision
question goes opposite to our findings and, hence, our significance inferences are not
invalidated but are conservative.
The two-stage model Several authors have studied a two-stage decomposition
W Eð Þ ¼ ew J Eð Þð Þ ð17Þ
where J denotes directly-judged belief, and ew is the function carrying those judg-
ments to decision weights (de Lara Resende & Wu 2010; Fox and Tversky 1998;
Kilka and Weber 2001; Tversky and Fox 1995; Viscusi and Evans 2006; Wu and
Gonzalez 1999). Earlier allusions to the two-stage decompositions with directly-
judged beliefs J are in Fellner (1961 p. 672) and Kahneman and Tversky (1975 pp.
14, 15). The two-stage decomposition differs from our decompositionW Eð Þ ¼ w m Eð Þð Þ
where m denotes matching probability and w is the risky weighting function. We can
study the two-stage model in Experiment B, where we measured judged
probabilities. For C-ambiguity, ew of Eq. 17 then exhibits the usual inverse-S shape.
This illustrates once more that our findings for C-ambiguity are due to beliefs
deviating from midpoint probabilities rather than to unusual ambiguity attitudes.
5 Conclusion
This paper introduced modern ambiguity models into the empirical study of belief
aggregation. These ambiguity models are descriptively more accurate than the common
classical Bayesian models, and explain the violations of the latter that we found in belief
aggregation. They allow the distinction of cognitive factors (ability to discriminate
different levels of likelihood) and motivational factors (aversion to ambiguity), and
the analysis of their separate effects. In between-agent uncertainty (conflict; C-
ambiguity), extreme beliefs generate extra preference value (source preference) and,
as regards cognitive effects, are overweighted in belief aggregation. These phenomena
do not occur in within-agent uncertainty (imprecision; I-ambiguity). The latter is closer
to traditional ambiguity. For C-ambiguity, the cognitive effects entail an empirical
violation of the commonly assumed averaging of beliefs.
An implication of our findings for belief aggregation is that agents may want to
overpresent their certainty. Hence, it is extra warranted for principals to implement
incentive-compatible bonuses. An implication for modern theories of ambiguity is
that identical (convex hulls of) possible priors can be treated differently by the same
individual depending on the source of uncertainty. We conclude that modern ambi-
guity theory has allowed a more refined, and empirically more valid, analysis of
belief aggregation in our paper than would have been possible using traditional
theories.
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Appendix
Experimental details and further results
This appendix gives experimental details and further results. We first describe details
pertaining to both experiments.
Experimental details for both experiments
Stimuli for eliciting certainty equivalents (CEs)
Figure 6 displays some stimuli.
To simplify the subjects’ task, the screenshots for risky, I and C sources of
uncertainty had exactly the same structure. Risky/I/C prospects (Option 1) were
systematically displayed on the left-hand side and the sure loss (Option 2) was
displayed on the right-hand side of the computer screen. Whatever the source
of uncertainty, x (high loss) was assigned to purple and y (small loss) to
yellow. There was no time pressure. Subjects were given the time they needed
and were encouraged to think carefully about the questions. The software
allowed the subjects to modify their answers if they wished, by going
backward.
Procedure for eliciting certainty equivalents
We developed computerized bisection software to estimate the CEs. Bisection does
not require subjects to state precise indifference values. It involves choices only, and
generates more reliable data than direct matching (Bostic et al. 1990; Fischer et al.
1999; Noussair et al. 2004).
Each CE measurement started with a choice between the prospect considered and a
sure loss equal to the expected value under the (midpoint) probability. A preference
for the sure loss (the prospect) generated a higher (lower) sure loss in the next
question. The new sure loss was the midpoint of the highest sure loss accepted up
to that point (or the worst outcome of the prospect if no sure loss had been accepted)
and the lowest sure loss rejected up to that point (or the best outcome of the prospect
if no sure loss had been rejected).
Subjects were asked to make choices until a sure loss resulted with a precision of
±1% of the difference between the two outcomes of the prospect, and this sure loss
was taken as the CE. Between three and seven choices were usually required to
estimate CEs. The precision was implemented as the stopping rule of the bisection
process. For instance, if Option 1 involved outcomes €0 and €1000, the program
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stopped when the subjects had rejected a sure loss, but had accepted another sure loss
that was €20 lower. Table 6 gives an example.
Table 6 Actual choices of Subject 6 in Experiment B for a C prospect used to generate the certainty
equivalent
Question Option 1 Option 2 Choice
1 −1000{0.4,0.6}0 −500 Option 1
2 −1000{0.4,0.6}0 −260 Option 2
3 −1000{0.4,0.6}0 −380 Option 2
4 −1000{0.4,0.6}0 −440 Option 1
5 −1000{0.4,0.6}0 −420 Option 1
6 −1000{0.4,0.6}0 −400 Option 2
Certainty Equivalent: −410
Screenshot A: A risky prospect vs. a sure amount 
Screenshot B: A C prospect vs. a sure amount 
Fig. 6 Screenshots of typical choice tasks (Experiments A and B)
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This elicitation process prevented subjects from evaluating prospects higher
(lower) than their best (worst) outcomes. It also ensured that a sure loss would
not be rejected when a higher one had been already accepted (by not asking
such a question). It did not preclude all violations of stochastic dominance. For
example, subjects could assign a lower certainty equivalent to xpy than to xp′y
despite p′ > p.
Experimental details for Experiment B
Stimuli for eliciting judged beliefs
Figure 7 displays the successive screenshots used to elicit judged belief under C,
before (Screenshot A) and after (Screenshot B) entering a judged belief.
Screenshot A: Initial screen 
Screenshot B: After a judged belief has been entered 
Fig. 7 Screenshots of typical judgment task: A C prospect (Experiment B)
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Additional results for both experiments
Consistency checks
The main text reports consistency checks. In the two experiments, neither the source
of uncertainty nor the question characteristics influence the consistency. In Experi-
ment A, some choices are repeated as a consistency check. A Friedman test reveals
that the consistency rate does not significantly depend on the source of uncertainty
(p00.34). Similarly, a Cochran test for dichotomous data shows that it does not
significantly depend on the question (p00.08). In Experiment B, several certainty
equivalents (randomly selected) were elicited twice. An ANOVA shows that neither
the source of uncertainty (p00.15), nor the midpoint probability (p00.23), nor the
minimum loss (p00.85), nor the maximum loss (p00.68) of the prospects, signifi-
cantly influences the measurement errors.
Certainty equivalents
In Tables 7, 8, and 9, each line has 61 observations and the degree of freedom of each
test is 60. EV means expected value and StD means standard deviation.
Risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity attitudes directly inferred from certainty equivalents
The main text reported tests of risk and ambiguity attitudes using the parameters
estimated through parametric fitting. We can also analyze risk and ambiguity attitudes
by directly comparing CEs with expected values and other CEs. These tests are
consistent with the results in the main text, and are reported next.
Experiment A
To test risk attitudes, we compare CEs with expected values for the risky prospects
A1–A10 using t-tests. We find that people are mainly risk averse for low probabilities
(A1: p00.02) and risk seeking for moderate and high probabilities (A4–A10: p<
0.01). Risk neutrality cannot be rejected for the other two prospects. These results are
consistent with the common findings for prospect theory for risk (Wakker 2010 §9.5).
For the other prospects, both risk and ambiguity attitudes play a role. We use the term
uncertainty attitude for the combination of the two. We use midpoint probabilities for
I and C to obtain (analogs of) expected values.
We find uncertainty aversion for I-ambiguity in the sense that CE < EV for low
probabilities (A11–A12: p<0.01) and uncertainty seeking for moderate and high
probabilities (A14, A15: p<0.01). Neutrality cannot be rejected for A13. These results
confirm the prediction of prospect theory that phenomena for risk similarly occur for
ambiguity, even in an amplified manner (referenced in the main text). The latter predic-
tion is less clearly confirmed for C-ambiguity. We only find uncertainty aversion for one
low probability (A17: p00.04). We do find uncertainty seeking for moderate and high
probabilities (A19, A20: p<0.01). Uncertainty neutrality cannot be rejected for A16
and A18. These results show again that other factors play a role for C-ambiguity.
We can directly infer ambiguity attitudes from CEs by comparing the CEs elicited
for I- or C-ambiguity (A11-A15 and A16-A20) with those elicited under risk (A1–
A5). Although this analysis will, obviously, not give exactly the same results and
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Table 7 Statistics of certainty equivalents
# Midpoint X y EV Mean Median StD t-test Mean vs. EV 95% Confidence Interval
t p Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
Experiment A
A1 R 0.1 −1000 0 −100 −146 −90 148 −2.41 0.02 −184 −108
A2 R 0.3 −1000 0 −300 −333 −290 134 −1.90 0.06 −367 −298
A3 R 0.5 −1000 0 −500 −483 −490 138 0.98 0.33 −518 −448
A4 R 0.7 −1000 0 −700 −633 −670 150 3.51 0.00 −671 −594
A5 R 0.9 −1000 0 −900 −767 −770 130 7.99 0.00 −800 −733
A6 R 0.5 −500 0 −250 −223 −215 65 3.23 0.00 −240 −207
A7 R 0.5 −500 −250 −375 −358 −373 32 4.12 0.00 −366 −350
A8 R 0.5 −750 −500 −625 −603 −608 35 5.06 0.00 −611 −594
A9 R 0.5 −1000 −500 −750 −701 −715 65 5.90 0.00 −717 −684
A10 R 0.5 −1000 −750 −875 −852 −863 36 4.99 0.00 −861 −843
A11 I 0.1 −1000 0 −100 −221 −210 146 −6.49 0.00 −259 −184
A12 I 0.3 −1000 0 −300 −346 −290 121 −2.96 0.00 −377 −315
A13 I 0.5 −1000 0 −500 −488 −490 120 0.76 0.45 −519 −458
A14 I 0.7 −1000 0 −700 −655 −650 105 3.34 0.00 −682 −628
A15 I 0.9 −1000 0 −900 −788 −790 107 8.13 0.00 −816 −761
A16 C 0.1 −1000 0 −100 −102 −90 76 −0.25 0.80 −122 −83
A17 C 0.3 −1000 0 −300 −333 −290 123 −2.09 0.04 −364 −301
A18 C 0.5 −1000 0 −500 −467 −450 156 1.63 0.11 −507 −427
A19 C 0.7 −1000 0 −700 −649 −670 135 2.98 0.00 −683 −614
A20 C 0.9 −1000 0 −900 −828 −850 102 5.53 0.00 −854 −802
Experiment B
B1 R 0.1 −1000 0 −100 −135 −90 122 −2.26 0.03 −166 −104
B2 R 0.2 −1000 0 −200 −215 −190 131 −0.92 0.36 −249 −182
B3 R 0.4 −1000 0 −400 −409 −390 134 −0.51 0.61 −443 −374
B4 R 0.5 −1000 0 −500 −482 −490 168 0.85 0.40 −525 −439
B5 R 0.6 −1000 0 −600 −558 −590 156 2.10 0.04 −598 −518
B6 R 0.8 −1000 0 −800 −749 −790 128 3.10 0.00 −782 −716
B7 R 0.9 −1000 0 −900 −841 −870 113 4.06 0.00 −870 −813
B8 R 0.5 −500 0 −250 −244 −245 84 0.58 0.56 −265 −222
B9 R 0.5 −500 −250 −375 −350 −358 52 3.86 0.00 −363 −336
B10 R 0.5 −750 −500 −625 −611 −623 46 2.32 0.02 −623 −599
B11 R 0.5 −1000 −500 −750 −701 −715 95 4.01 0.00 −726 −677
B12 R 0.5 −1000 −750 −875 −841 −848 50 5.24 0.00 −854 −829
B13 I 0.1 −1000 0 −100 −173 −130 130 −4.41 0.00 −207 −140
B14 I 0.5 −1000 0 −500 −489 −490 141 0.58 0.56 −526 −453
B15 I 0.9 −1000 0 −900 −833 −870 134 3.88 0.00 −868 −799
B16 C 0.1 −1000 0 −100 −117 −90 100 −1.35 0.18 −143 −92
B17 C 0.5 −1000 0 −500 −510 −490 146 −0.52 0.61 −547 −472
B18 C 0.9 −1000 0 −900 −854 −890 128 2.82 0.01 −887 −821
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significance values as the analysis in the main text (which involves more data—we
ignore A6–A10 here—and nonlinear transformations), most results, and all main
phenomena described in the main text remain the same. First, an ANOVA corrected
for repeated measures (with the Greenhouse-Geisser correction) with two factors (the
five probability levels and the two types of ambiguity plus risk) confirms that CEs
depend on the probability level (p<0.01), which is obvious, but they also depend on
the type of ambiguity or risk (p<0.01). The interaction term is also significant (p<
0.01), confirming that the degree of ambiguity aversion depends on how likely the
occurrence of the bad outcome is. These results are the same as those obtained for
matching probabilities in the main text.
Second, we can use CEs to analyze overall ambiguity aversion, similarly to how
we used the ambiguity aversion index in the main text as an overall index. Thus we
compare, for all probability levels together, the CEs under the two types of ambiguity
with those under risk (i.e., the main effect of the second factor of the ANOVA), to
Table 8 Statistics of matching probabilities and judged beliefs
Midpoint Mean Median StD t-test Mean vs. Midpoint 95% Confidence Interval
t p Lower Bound Upper Bound
Experiment A—Matching probabilities
I 0.1 0.19 0.13 0.16 4.43 0.00 0.15 0.23
I 0.3 0.33 0.31 0.15 1.52 0.13 0.29 0.37
I 0.5 0.53 0.54 0.14 1.71 0.09 0.49 0.56
I 0.7 0.73 0.73 0.15 1.67 0.10 0.69 0.77
I 0.9 0.86 0.88 0.11 −2.87 0.01 0.83 0.89
C 0.1 0.06 0.04 0.07 −4.20 0.00 0.05 0.08
C 0.3 0.31 0.30 0.15 0.46 0.65 0.27 0.35
C 0.5 0.49 0.50 0.19 −0.30 0.76 0.44 0.54
C 0.7 0.73 0.75 0.13 1.92 0.06 0.70 0.77
C 0.9 0.90 0.92 0.08 0.37 0.71 0.88 0.92
Experiment B—Matching probabilities
I 0.1 0.16 0.12 0.13 3.30 0.00 0.12 0.19
I 0.5 0.52 0.51 0.12 1.45 0.15 0.49 0.55
I 0.9 0.86 0.89 0.11 −2.57 0.01 0.84 0.89
C 0.1 0.10 0.07 0.10 −0.06 0.96 0.07 0.13
C 0.5 0.54 0.53 0.11 2.77 0.01 0.51 0.56
C 0.9 0.87 0.90 0.12 −1.72 0.09 0.84 0.90
Experiment B—Judged beliefs
I 0.1 0.11 0.10 0.02 1.62 0.11 0.10 0.11
I 0.5 0.50 0.50 0.02 1.55 0.13 0.50 0.51
I 0.9 0.90 0.90 0.03 0.47 0.64 0.89 0.91
C 0.1 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.37 0.71 0.09 0.11
C 0.5 0.50 0.50 0.03 0.46 0.64 0.49 0.51
C 0.9 0.91 0.90 0.03 2.72 0.01 0.90 0.92
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assess ambiguity aversion. The result can then be compared with the results derived
from the ambiguity aversion index. This analysis shows that, overall, CEs under I-
ambiguity are lower than those under risk (p<0.01), which indicates ambiguity
aversion under I-ambiguity. There is no difference between the effect of risk and
the effect of C-ambiguity (p01), indicating ambiguity neutrality in C-ambiguity. CEs
under I-ambiguity are lower than under C-ambiguity (p<0.01), indicating more
ambiguity aversion under I-ambiguity than under C-ambiguity. In other words, these
results replicate the findings that the ambiguity aversion index is positive under I-
ambiguity and higher under I- than under C-ambiguity.
Third, pairwise comparisons of CEs at each probability level are also in-
structive to observe the effect of a-insensitivity. Consistent with the a-
insensitivity index being negative for C-ambiguity, CEs tend to be higher under
C-ambiguity than under risk at r00.1 (p00.06) and lower at r00.9 (p<0.01). This
indeed reveals that CEs vary more under C-ambiguity than under risk when the
midpoint probability varies, suggesting a-generated over-sensitivity for C-ambiguity.
However, CEs vary less under I-ambiguity than under risk when probabilities vary:
they are significantly lower at 0.1 (p00.01) and not significantly different at 0.9 (p0
0.72). Again, this is consistent with the positive a-insensitivity index that we obtain
for I-ambiguity.
Table 9 Statistics of indexes
Index Mean Median StD t-test 95% Confidence Interval
t p Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
Experiment A
Matching probabilities Ambiguity I 0.06 0.06 0.15 2.94 0.00 0.02 0.10
Aversion C 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.04 0.97 −0.03 0.03
Insensitivity I 0.13 0.06 0.27 3.84 0.00 0.06 0.20
C −0.05 −0.04 0.20 −2.08 0.04 −0.10 0.00
Experiment B
Matching probabilities Ambiguity I 0.03 0.00 0.13 1.77 0.08 0.00 0.06
Aversion C 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.46 0.64 −0.02 0.04
Insensitivity I 0.12 0.03 0.25 3.64 0.00 0.05 0.18
C 0.03 0.00 0.21 1.16 0.25 −0.02 0.09
Judged beliefs Ambiguity I 0.01 0.00 0.04 1.49 0.14 0.00 0.02
Aversion C 0.01 0.00 0.05 1.62 0.11 0.00 0.02
Insensitivity I 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.89 0.38 −0.01 0.01
C −0.01 0.00 0.06 −1.75 0.08 −0.03 0.00
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Finally, we report in the main text that mi(0.1)>mc(0.1) (p<0.01) and mi(0.9)<
mc(0.9) (p<0.01). We similarly find that the CEs are lower under I- than under C-
ambiguity at 0.1 (p<0.01) and higher under I- than under C-ambiguity at 0.9 (p0
0.04). This inversion, which appears both for matching probabilities and CEs, can be
explained by more a-insensitivity under I- than under C-ambiguity (as we found using
indexes for matching probabilities).
Experiment B
As in Experiment A, we compare CEs with expected values to investigate risk and
ambiguity attitudes. For risk (B1–B10), we find risk aversion for small probabilities
(B1: p00.03), but risk seeking for moderate and high probabilities (B5: p00.04; B10:
p00.02; B6, B7, B9–B12: p<0.01). Risk neutrality cannot be rejected for the other
four prospects. These results are again consistent with what prospect theory predicts.
Similar to Experiment A, for I-ambiguity we find uncertainty aversion for small
probabilities (B13: p<0.01), but uncertainty seeking for intermediate and high
probabilities (B15: p<0.01). Uncertainty neutrality cannot be rejected for B14.
Again, these results are consistent with what prospect theory predicts.
As in Experiment A, we find a less clear pattern for C-ambiguity. Uncertainty
seeking for high probabilities (B18: p<0.01) is still significant, but uncertainty
neutrality cannot be rejected for B16 and B17.
Ambiguity attitudes can be analyzed by comparing the CEs under risk (B1,
B4, B7) with the CEs obtained for I-ambiguity (B13, B14, B15), and then with
the CEs obtained for C-ambiguity (B16, B17, B18). As for matching probabil-
ities, an ANOVA corrected for repeated measures (with the Greenhouse-Geisser
correction) with two factors (the five probability levels and the two types of
ambiguity plus risk) shows that the probability factor and the interaction term
are significant (p<0.01).
The effect of the type of ambiguity or risk (not distinguishing probability levels;
i.e., studying the main effect of the first factor of the ANOVA) does not differ from
one type to the others (p>0.4 for all pairwise comparisons). This is consistent with
the finding that the ambiguity aversion index is not significantly different from 0 for
C-ambiguity and only marginally significant for I-ambiguity.
In the main text, we report a-insensitivity for I-ambiguity and more a-insensitivity
for I-ambiguity than in C-ambiguity. This is consistent with CEs in I-ambiguity being
significantly lower than CEs under risk and C-ambiguity at midpoint 0.1 (p00.04 and
p<0.01) and not significantly different at midpoint 0.9 (p01 and p00.4). For low
likelihoods, our subjects indeed disliked the I-ambiguity prospect more than the other
prospects, but this difference disappeared for higher likelihoods (and was even
reversed, though not significantly, in CEs). Consequently, as for matching probabil-
ities, the CEs at 0.1 and 0.9 tended to be closer to each other for I-ambiguity than they
were for C-ambiguity or risk. This property for matching probability is what we
defined to be a-insensitivity.
As a conclusion, for both Experiment A and Experiment B, all phenomena
observed for matching probabilities are consistent with those derived from the CEs.
Therefore, the parametric family that we used to obtain matching probabilities does
not influence the results. However, the CE analysis is more complex, for instance
involving multiple, simultaneous comparisons to observe a-insensitivity. This is why
we decided to report the analysis in terms of matching probabilities in the main text.
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Risk attitude
In both Experiments A and B, the mean estimate of the parameter of the utility function
significantly exceeds 1, indicating concavity of the utility function. Although in the loss
domain, individuals are supposed to mostly have convex utility functions (Tversky and
Kahneman 1992), experimental studies in the loss domain have reported mixed atti-
tudes. Some studies have reported convex utility functions at least at the individual level,
while others have reported linear (Abdellaoui et al. 2008) and concave utility functions
(Abdellaoui et al. 2007; Fennema and Van Assen 1998; Etchart-Vincent 2004).
In both experiments, the probability weighting function exhibits some optimism.
This result is consistent with other studies in the loss domain (Abdellaoui 2000;
Etchart-Vincent 2004). As regards sensitivity, the probability weighting function of
Experiment A exhibits the usual inverse-S shape whereas the function is convex in
Experiment B.
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